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Abstract
The end of the Cold war catalysed considerable recalibration in the world's security architecture. In
Australia, whilst this entailed a closer embrace of Asia, the South Pacific did not initially engage
Australian security interests. However, post 11 September 2001 and post the terrorist attacks in Bali of
October 2002, much has changed. The notion of 'comprehensive security'—in which Pacific security is
seen as a function of a wide variety of social, political and strategic phenomena—has assumed such
prominence it has ushered in an expanded justification for one state to intervene in the affairs of another.
Although, as in the case of the Regional Assistance Mission to the Solomon Islands, such intervention
has required invitation and multinational coalitions under the rubric 'cooperative intervention', the extent
and nature of Australian-led initiatives in the South Pacific has raised concerns. Key amongst these
concerns is the extent to which policies such as tied-aid and 'extended cooperation' might erode South
Pacific sovereignty and the consensus politics of the Pacific Way. This article considers these issues
against the backdrop of very significant changes to the region's key political body, the Pacific Forum. It
suggests that although Australia is commendably active in strengthening the Pacific's security net,
greater sensitivity to Pacific concerns might better effect her longer-term security objectives.
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South Pacific security & the emerging 125
doctrine of'cooperative intervention':

The end of the Cold war catalysed considerable recalibration in the world's security ar
chitecture. In Australia, whilst this entailed a closer embrace of Asia, the South Pacific
did not initially engage Australian security interests. However, post 11 September 2001
and post the terrorist attacks in Bali of October 2002, much has changed. The notion
of'comprehensive security'—in which Pacific security is seen as a function of a wide
variety of social, political and strategic phenomena—has assumed such prominence
it has ushered in an expanded justification for one state to intervene in the affairs of
another. Although, as in the case of the Regional Assistance Mission to the Solomon
Islands, such intervention has required invitation and multinational coalitions under
the rubric'cooperative intervention', the extent and nature of Australian-led initiatives
in the South Pacific has raised concerns. Key amongst these concerns is the extent to
which policies such as tied-aid and 'extended cooperation'might erode South Pacific
sovereignty and the consensus politics of the Pacific Way. This article considers these
issues against the backdrop of very significant changes to the region's key political
body, the Pacific Forum. It suggests that although Australia is commendably active in
strengthening the Pacific's security net, greater sensitivity to Pacific concerns might
better effect her longer-term security objectives.
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126 Introduction
During theCold war, discourseon Asia-Pacific regional security was premised upon
exclusionary assumptions:'the region'was where the US exercised influence and
the Soviet Union did not. Likewise/security policy'eschewed positive conditions
such as peace, participation or emancipation in the name of mere stability.1
Unsurprisingly, the end of the Cold War wrought considerable change worldwide
- including an attendant proliferation of 'failed' and 'rogue' states. Transnational
crime, quick to flourish in the slipstream of globalisation, ushered in an expanded
concept of 'security'. Supplanting the hubs and spokes of bilateral alliances
that had maintained the cordon sanitaire around the Soviet Union grew a raft
of multilateral institutions,2 mandated to facilitate the attainment of a regional
security that could be branded "common, comprehensive and cooperative".3 So
too in the Asia-Pacific region, the early nineties brought a significant change in
security architecture and discourse. In effecting this new discourse, the attentions
of Australian strategic planners initially leap-frogged immediate neighbours in the
South Pacific and focused instead upon protecting Australia's strategic interests
through engagement with South-East Asia. The medicine for more proximate
regional problems was a liberal dose of aid coupled with the "clever management
of trouble".4
The terrorist attacks in Bali in October 2002, however, wrought a paradigm shift in
Australian strategic planning.The security radar of Australia swept more cautiously
across the South Pacific. Blips such as the Solomon Islands, Papua New Guinea
and Fiji came to assume greater significance. Response mechanisms, however,
were less clear. As exemplified by Australia's political disengagement from post
coup Fiji, "clever management" had been non-interventionist and had respected
the sovereign interests of Australia's Pacific neighbours. Canberra's decision in
mid-2003 to promote direct intervention in the Solomon Islands, albeit under the
umbrella of'regional assistance', ushered in a fresh strategic approach to problems
of state stability: the doctrine of'cooperative intervention'.
This paper considers the emergence of'comprehensive security'and'cooperative
intervention'as pillars of Australian security policy. More particularly, it examines
Canberra's connection between the two—as manifested especially by Australia's
leading role in the recent intervention the Solomon Islands. It considers also the
consequent, and impressive, breadth of Australia's (more conventional) assistance
in the law and justice sectors of her Pacific Island neighbours. Finally, and against
this backdrop, the future for regional cooperation is assessed. It is argued that,
particularly in the area of regional crisis management, the romance of consensus
politics, as enshrined by the evocative notion of the 'Pacific Way', is most unlikely

to withstand a stealthy and concerted application of an Australian regional
security strategy that already betrays unilateralist undertones and is impelled by
the politically crucial imperative of avoiding another Bali. Ultimately, however, a
Canberra-driven assault upon the'Pacific Way'may prove self-defeating.
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Even adorned with modifiers such as "cooperative" and "comprehensive", security
in the Asia-Pacific has remained steadfastly dominated by the realism of state selfinterest.7 This is perhaps unremarkable as, despite its failures, the nation state is
the "most pervasive and effective form of exclusion in world politics"8and is seen
as the only vehicle capable of providing any form of regional security. As the
Australian Prime Minister has only recently noted, this especially true today:
Despite all we know about the importance of non-state actors in the
international system, the nation state remains the focus of legitimate
action for order and justice in our world. September 11 returned the state
to centre-stage for the oldest of reasons— the provision of security.9
Until recently, the islands of the South Pacific had been largely divorced from this
new security discourse. Australia, clearly the major regional power, chose to focus
primarily upon South-East Asia in terms of both security and trade.10 The South
Pacific Forum's 1992 Honiara Declaration on Law Enforcement Cooperation did,
however, note a need for a "more comprehensive, integrated and collaborative
approach" to "threats from criminal activities" and mandated the Forum Regional
Security Committee to, inter alia, "establish a framework for increasing contacts
amongst specialist agencies".11 In 1997, this bedrock declaration was followed by
another:theAitutaki Declaration on RegionalSecurityCooperation.Reflectiveofthe
new discourse, the Aitutaki Declaration commenced with the express observation
that "an adverse law enforcement environment could threaten the sovereignty,
security and economic integrity of Forum members and jeopardise economic and
social development". A need was identified for a "more comprehensive approach
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In the early to mid-nineties, 'security' came to entail two central propositions:
(i) that security depends principally not upon countering military threat but
upon creating 'human security'— a notion that encompasses respect for human
rights, the protection of the environment, provision of employment and brighter
prospects for future generations;5and (ii) that effecting such security requires a
multilateral, cooperative approach— one that sits outside alliance structures
and espouses the'soft'politics of confidence building measures-and preventive
diplomacy.6
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to regional security consistent with the relevant principles of the United Nation's
'Agenda for Peace'". Principles of 'good governance', 'international cooperation'
and 'preventive diplomacy'were espoused.
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Similar sentiments carried through to the Biketawa declaration of 2002 which
recognised the "vulnerability of member countries to threats to their security,
broadly defined, and the importance of cooperation among members in dealing
with such threats when they arise" (emphasis added). The Nasonirii Declaration
on Regional Security followed in 2003 and served to underscore the "heightened
threat to global security"following the attacks of 11 September 2001, "in particular
those posed by international terrorism and transnational crime". It exhorted
member states to enact appropriate legislation, including anti-money laundering
legislation, and to "develop strategies to combat serious crime".
Post-September 11 and post-Bali, Australia is very much a part of this emergent
security discourse. This is perhaps unsurprising. On 12 November 2002— exactly
one calendar month after the devastating attacks in Kuta, Bali—Al Q'aeda leader
Osama Bin Laden announced (via videotape released in the United Kingdom):
We warned Australia before not to join in in Afghanistan, and against its
despicable effort to separate East Timor. It ignored our warning until it
woke up to the sounds of explosions in Bali. Its government falsely claimed
that they were not targeted.12
Unsurprisingly, Australian Minister of Defence, Robert Hill, now speaks of the
"dangers of trying to draw a line around Australia's strategic interests":
...regional terrorism, global security and the defence of Australia in this
new strategic environment are very much the same thing.13
Identified in the 1997 Aitutaki Declaration and seen ever since as an increasingly
integral precondition to comprehensive security is the notion of'good governance'.
Indeed, underthe Biketawa Declaration/good governance'was pitched alongside
democracy as a"GuidingPrinciple"to which member states considered themselves
committed. Good governance itself was defined as "the exercise of authority
(leadership) and interactions in a manner that is open, transparent, accountable,
participatory, consultative and decisive but fair and equitable". Although this
definition is silent on appropriate economic policy, where the only two regional
powers—Australia and New Zealand— both ardently pursue free-market agendas,
notions of'good governance'areaptto connote the implementation of neoliberal
reform. Indeed, Australia has already announced her intentions to place a "strong
focus" on the "economic and financial management" of her Pacific neighbours.14

This is not of purely fiscal interest: in considering threats to the security of the
region, "broadly defined", the Aitutaki Declaration lumps "economic policy" in
with nefarious phenomena such as drug trafficking and natural disasters as "the
most immediate risks to security in the region".15

Direct engagement, including security assistance, might be needed. Such
engagement would involve cooperative intervention—working with and
at the request of the relevant government, together with other partners
in the region.19
Yet Australia had for years refused requests for assistance by the Solomons.
Indeed in January, only five months earlier, Mr Downer had declared:
Sending in Australian troops to occupy the Solomon Islands would be folly
in the extreme. It would be widely resented in the Pacific region. It would
not work, no matter how it wds dressed up.20
Although the Foreign Minister sought to explain this volte-face on the basis that
earlier intervention would have pre-empted the peace process and entailed
"imposing an external solution by force",21 Canberra's earlier position was in fact
entirely "consistent with its previous 'indigenous solutions' policy approach"
and was "based on the calculation that Australia's interests were not sufficiently
engaged to warrant direct police or military intervention".22 This was reflective of
a broader antipathy in which South Pacific regional politics was seen merely as a
matter of "cleverly managing trouble".23
The success of the Australian-led INTERFET operation in East Timor "doubtless
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The Australian-led Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands (RAMSI)
commenced on 24 July 2003 and attested a"paradigm shift in Canberra's strategic
thinking".16The decision to intervene closely followed the June 2003 release of an
Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI) report entitled "Our failing neighbour:
Australia and the future of Solomon Islands". The report urged a "sustained
and comprehensive multinational effort" led by Australia and consented to by
Honiara. The report acknowledged that such intervention would "take us across
a major threshold, and challenge the foundations of our policy in the Southwest
Pacific, which involves providing countries with aid, but expecting them to solve
their own problems".17 In a supportive launching of the report, Australia's Foreign
Minister, Alexander Downer, announced that Australia will not"sit back and watch
while a country struggles".18 He added:
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played a part in fostering Canberra's attitude change".24 By July 2003, Canberra
understood that Australian-controlled "multilateral" operations could provide
effective delivery vehicles in an emerging, interventionist climate.25

Conventional security cooperation
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Despite suggestions in the 2003 Australian Foreign Affairs and Trade White Paper
that "Australia cannot presume to fix the problems of the South Pacific countries",
that "Australia is not a neo-colonial power" and that "the island countries are
independent sovereign states", Australia is intensely involved in strengthening
the region's comprehensive security net.
In PNG, Australia is undertaking an 'Enhanced Cooperation Program'(ECP). The
ECP comes on the back of long-standing attempts at extensive sector reform
programmes in PNG (costing some A$60 million) and in Fiji. As originally
announced in December 2003, the programme required PNG to accept 230
Australian Federal Police (AFP) and around 80 bureaucratic'advisers'as officers
of the PNG state, including even an Australian replacement for the PNG Solicitor
General. Not surprisingly, the leaders of PNG saw this intensified relationship as
problematic and negotiations over the ECP dragged through to June 2004. Today,
the program has been formalised by way of an addition to the overall AustraliaPNG treaty. The AFP deployment— by far the most significant aspect of the ECP—
currently stands at 125:106 in Port Moresby and a further 19 in Bougainville.26
In Indonesia, Australia is implementing both a A$10 million counter-terrorism
initiativeand a A$3.5 million anti money laundering programme.27It is undertaking
ongoing work to help improve the capacity of the Samoan and Vanuatu police
forces.28 In August 2003, Prime Minister Howard presented the Pacific Islands
Forum with a Pacific Regional Police Initiative auguring the establishment, in Suva,
of a training centre capable of developing a 'regional police force' at the rate of
900 officers per year.29 Australia has also helped to establish 'Transnational Crime
Units'in the police forces of Fiji, Samoa, Tonga, Vanuatu and Papua New Guinea.30
A Solomon Islands unit is slated for launch mid this year.31 These units have not
only key intelligence-gathering functions but are primary operational institutions
in policing transnational crime.32 In April 2004 the Australian Federal Police
'Law Enforcement Cooperation Programme' established a Pacific Transnational
Crime Coordination Centre in Suva. This will constitute a regional hub linking
the national Transnational Crime Units— again for both intelligence sharing and
operational purposes. More recently still, in July 2004 the Jakarta Centre for
Law Enforcement Cooperation (JCLEC) was officially opened pursuant to a joint
initiative between the Australian and Indonesian governments. The Centre's
objective is to enhance the operational expertise of regional law enforcement

"Big Brother"? tied aid and interventionism
At the launch of the ASPI report, Australia’s Foreign Minister carefully imbued his
"struggling neighbour"speech with liberalistic vernacular:
I was in Solomon Islands late last year and the human cost of this trouble is
obvious.There are high numbers of unemployed young people wandering
the streets. Children are not receiving the education they need because
teachers are not being paid on time and schools lack sufficient funding.
Without donor help, there would be no health services in the provinces.
Last month there was another tragic incident involving the murder of
an Australian missionary. Economic activity will not revive without an
improvement in law and order.37
Yet in a separate report published only a few months later, the author of the
"failing neighbour" report, Elsina Wainright, graphically laid plain Australia's own
security interests:
Failed or failing states are often petri dishes for transnational criminal
activity such as money laundering, arms smuggling, drug trafficking,
people trafficking, and terrorism.38
The report also identified a wider strategic dimension to Australia's security
interests: a bankrupt Solomons would have provided potential for a foreign
power to establish influence in the region.39 Prime Minister John Floward was
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Consistent with Canberra's move towards 'tied aid; the cooperation model
effected by Australia thodghout the region is no longer one of long-term financial
assistance but one in which'key personnel'are inserted into the law and justice
structures of Pacific states.34 An examination of the nature of some of these key
positions similarly bears out the emphasis now placed upon good governance.
The'Special Coordinator'to RAMSI is an Australian. Australia funds the positions
of Police Commissioner and Deputy Director of Public Prosecutions in Fiji. On 29
October 2004, Australia deployed to Nauru two senior police officers to fill the
roles of'Director of Police'and 'Special Police Adviser'.35 An Australian is likely to
replace the outgoing British police commissioner of the SolomonHslands.36
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agencies in dealing with transnational crime. Australia and Indonesia also co
chaired a Regional Ministerial Meeting on Counter-Terrorism in Bali in February
2004—a meeting that "produced concrete outcomes in the critical areas of law
enforcement, information sharing and legal frameworks".33
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also less altruistic in his justifications, stating that a "failed state" could become
a "haven for terrorists, drug-runners and money-launderers".40 Presaging the
AFP's expanded role in implementing interventionist Australian policy is the
creation of the 500-strong AFP'International Deployment Group'to "strengthen
Australia's involvement in peace-keeping operations, missions to restore law
and order, and the delivery of capacity-building initiatives in the region".41 More
dramatically, at the time of the Bali attacks, the Prime Minister gave a warning
that, in future, Australia might take pre-emptive action against terrorist bases in
other countries42
Canberra has also sought to tie its provision of aid to the region. At the Forum
Leaders' Special Retreat in Auckland in April 2004, Mr Floward announced that
"increasingly in the future Australia will be saying as a condition of aid that
corruption must be eliminated".43This is a very significant flexing of power: per
capita, the South Pacific receives more aid than any other region in the world44—
the lion's share coming from Australia.45 Unsurprisingly, Mr Howard's comments
met with indignation from other leaders— Fiji's Prime Minister, Laisenia Qarase,
retorting (somewhat emptily) that "Fiji also has the right to choose whether
we accept the aid as an independent and sovereign state".46 Express demands
upon PNG to either deal with corruption or lose aid prompted Prime Minister
Sir Michael Somare to suggest that Australia could not form a government of
1000 tribes whereas "we have made a success of it".47 Australian aid constitutes
one fifth of PNG's budget. PNG ranks 118th out of 133 countries in Transparency
International's'corruption perceptions index'.48As evidenced by the ECP, continued
protestations from Port Moresby unsurprisingly rang hollow in Canberra.49
A thirty-year track record of failed aid policies for the Solomon Islands provided a
further catalyst for RAMSI—the ASPI "failing neighbour" report asserting that the
provision of further aid would have, at best, a "palliative" effect.50This emerging,
avuncular policy shift was soon applicable to the entire South Pacific. Following the
launch of RAMSI, Prime Minister Howard stated that RAMSI could lead to "pooled
regional governance" among island states that are "too small to be viable".51 In
October 2003, Alexander Downer announced that "in the rest of the region our
engagement will be based on an increasingly robust dialogue on reform"and that
"governance is now at the centre of all our programs in the region, with a strong
focus on law and order and economic and financial management."52
"Robust dialogue" is also employed to propel neoliberal economics through the
Pacific Agreement on Closer Economic Relations (PACER). Concerns are frequently
voiced as to the effects of PACER upon small island nations too under-resourced
to properly analyse the long-term ramifications of reciprocated free-trade. Some

The future for cooperation
The future of political consensus and true cooperation will turn upon the
effectiveness of the Pacific Islands Forum as a voice and vehicle for genuinely
multilateral action. The Forum's Auckland Declaration, reached at the Leaders'
Special Retreat in April 2004, asserts that the "key goals" of the Forum are
"economic growth, sustainable development, good governance and security''and
that "these goals should form the principal focus of the Forum and its Secretariat".
These goals are products of a greater "vision" of a "Pacific region that is respected
for the quality of its governance, the sustainable management of its resources,
the full observance of democratic values, and for its defence and promotion of
human rights". The vision itself is the first step in implementing recommendations
made by an 'Eminent Persons Group' (EPG) in a wholesale review of the Forum
and its secretariat. The EPG review notes that the Pacific is facing "considerable
challenges" and that overcoming them will require action "not only by national
Governments but also at the regional level". It calls for a'Pacific Plan'for"intensified
regional cooperation"that envisages "the pooling of regional resources in a range
of areas of governance", including the area of"regional law enforcement aimed at
trans-national crime":
It might be possible to consider introducing a regional panel of judges, a
common list of Pacific prosecutors, a regional shipping registry, a regional
financial intelligence unit...57
Success, the report posits, "involves a redefinition of the traditional 'Pacific Way'
of doing things".
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In August 2003, an Australian parliamentary inquiry into relations with the
Pacific reported regional disapproval at Australia's "big brother" approach.54 This
disapproval has also been noted by many writers and eminent commentators.
Back in August 2000, prominent Pacific affairs analyst Professor Ron Crocombe
commented that "naive and patronising lectures, postures and threats from
political leaders are losing Australia and New Zealand support throughout the
region".55 Doubtless, Alexander Downer's refusal to apologise over the recent
diplomatic debacle that saw the next Forum Chair, Sir Michael Somare, being
required to remove his shoes in a security check at Brisbane airport will do little to
assuage these perceptions of arrogance.56
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accounts of the initial negotiations in the formulation of that agreement also
"reveal a pattern of arrogance and intimidation that was led by Australia and
condoned, and sometimes mirrored, by New Zealand".53
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In urging "intensified cooperation'; the report expressly recognises that "trans
-national and regional security issues are seen by many in the region as likely
to dominate Forum attention for at least the next few years".58 From a security
cooperation perspective, a review of the Forum along the lines contained
in the EPG report is sensible lest the Forum's declarations end up as "empty
frameworks of cooperation''.59 The 1997 Aitutaki Declaration, although noting
that "existing arrangements" had failed to provide mechanisms that would
"enable members to respond promptly and effectively to requests for assistance",
failed to augur a greater role for the Forum or its secretariat in policy creation and
implementation, presaging instead some future agreement by Forum leaders
to develop procedures to "better facilitate responses by the region's disciplined
forces". The Biketawa Declaration, in dealing with the highly salient issue of
regional emergency management, paradoxically gives "a ritual bow"60 to state
sovereignty by expressly noting the essentiality of "respecting the principles of
non-interference", in short, "the so-called 'Pacific Way'[has been] a variant of the
ASEAN Way in Pacific garb".61
Implementation of the Pacific Plan will clearly vest greater prominence and
power in the Forum Secretariat. Indeed, the EPG recommends "a new Agreement
that updates and clearly sets down the role, functions and responsibilities of the
Secretariat" as well as the appointment of a second Deputy Secretary General.
It also underscores the "principal functions" of the Secretariat: policy advice,
coordination and implementation of leaders' decisions, "rather than the project
implementation and technical assistance functions that it has acquired over the
years". Paradoxically, a huge amount of this"project implementation and technical
assistance" is in the law and justice sector, particularly through legislative reform
and capacity building in the area of transnational crime prevention and counter
terrorism. The integral role of the Secretariat in these areas and the absence of an
obvious alternative make it difficult to believe that the Secretariat will relinquish
these functions in the near future.
Although the EPG has recommended that the Forum "mainstream" the concerns
of "vulnerable Small Island States" into its work, there is concern that the Pacific
Plan could prove a "Trojan horse that propels [Australia's neoliberal] agenda into
the heart of the Pacific".62To the extent that the agendas can now be separated,
the same horse would, of course, propel Australia's 'cooperative intervention'
security agenda. Indeed, there are signs that these early processes of reform
have already been exploited. At the Forum Leaders' Summit in 2001, Australia
initiated the removal of the requirement that the Secretary General come from a
Small Island Nation. At the following year's Summit, it succeeded in ousting the
unwritten convention of appointment by consensus, replacing it with a written

The EPG review itself is not above allegations of partisanship: it evolved from a
review of the capacity of the Forum to'Tneet a rapidly expanding array of demands"
into "a review of the Forum itself".68 The EPG's Reflection Group members were
predominantly New Zealanders. New Zealand trade officials helped write the final
report. This implicates Australia as there is a strong perception that "Wellington
plays London to Canberra's Washington".69 Indeed, the report's references to "the
pooling of regional resources in a range of areas of governance" so as to "offer
improved efficiencies"is uncannily reflective of comments by the Australian Prime
Minister's to the effect that RAMSI could lead to "pooled regional governance"
among island states that are "too small to be viable".70
A revamped Forum headed by an Australian with a proactive mandate to
coordinate responses "to regional events, particularly crises" fits neatly with
Australia's existing plans. In February 2004, ASPI released a report on the Australian
Government's increasing use of Australian Federal Police to preserve regional
security, noting that more than 7% of AFP personnel are deployed overseas.71
Initiatives such as these, the creation of the AFP'International Deployment Group'
and the Pacific Regional Police Initiative reflect the views expressed in the 2003
Australian Senate Committee Report that "preventing state decline is cheaper
than allowing states to deteriorate".72

Although RAMSI has produced a political environment capable of sustaining
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This sense of ownership has been eroded in recent years as economic,
political and security initiatives of the Forum seem to be increasingly driven
by Australia and New Zealand (who also control the purse strings). The
appointment of an Australian to the Secretary General position will make
it harder to reverse this trend, especially if he is expected by his sponsors
to be more proactive and lead a major overhaul of the organization.67
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election process. To complete the trifecta, in 2003 it secured the election of an
Australian, Greg Urwin, as Secretary General. Moreover, the election itself was
attended by "two days of haggling"63 and allegations of Australian interference.64
These developments are all the more significant as the Pacific Plan envisages a
radically expanded role for the Secretary General in "setting Forum agendas and
coordinating responses by members to regional events, particularly crises".65
Although such action must be taken in close consultation with Leaders, the
Secretary General is nevertheless projected to exercise executive function and
"to take a proactive role".66 Pacific-wide ownership of the Forum is now seen as
being at risk:
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effective government, Australia's "proactive role in advancing intervention"73and
in "cobbling together"74 the consensus required by its doctrine of cooperative
intervention has raised concerns. Indeed, allegations have been made that
although "dressed up as a Pacific Islands Forum project at the invitation of the
Solomons Government'; the reality was that "the landing date was set and forces
put into motion three weeks before the paperwork was done".75 Under the
proposed Pacific Plan it will be the Australian Secretary General, Mr Urwin, who
will have the moral and executive mandate to steer future interventions. So long
as the hands on the reins remain Australian, however, to many the horse itself
will appear suspiciously Trojan. Moreover, Australia's firm grip on the region's law
and justice sectors, the immense importance of Australian aid to the region and
Canberra's demonstrated preparedness to tie its provision to'good governance'
will certainly provide leverage when both'requests'and'consensus'are considered
necessary.76
Several academics are critical of not only the processes but the interventionist,
"panic-driven" responses themselves. At an inter-sessionary'panel discussion'on
"Challenges to Governance in the Pacific" at this year's FRSC meeting in Fiji, Dr
Sinclair Dinnan of the Australian National University challenged the appellation
"failed state", remarking that it falsely presumes a previously "functioning state"
(as opposed to one long beleaguered by inappropriate institutions inherited
from former colonial rule) and posits a false notion that imposing (urbanised)
government from "the top down" is the only appropriate model.77

The Pacific Way? more carrot— less stick.
In announcing Australia's emergent 'cooperative intervention' policy in his
"struggling neighbour" speech, Alexander Downer saw multilateralism as
essential. However, the successes of INTERFET and RAMSI have led to more US
vernacular and increased talk of'coalitions of the willing'.78 Such triumphs have
their dangers:
Such strikes [RAMSI] can have a certain seductive attraction. Unless the
terms of such interventions are clearly spelled out and are fully understood
by the wider international community, they can do unintended damage
to the established substructure of regional diplomacy and important
bilateral relations. Once delegitimised, the delicate multilateral balance,
painstakingly constructed in the aftermath of World War Two, would be
difficult to repair.79
Indeed, in a radical bid for pre-invasion support to the United States in the War

Challenges near and far demand a sense of balance and flexibility in our
policy approach. Just as the national interest is not static, nor should our
global engagement be hostage to yesterday's conventional wisdom.
Just as our country prospered from the fresh eyes Frank Lowy brought
to a world of opportunities, so each generation of Australians must look
anew at the eternal pursuit of our country's security and prosperity. We
have learned that, if we make the right choices, Australians can shape our
environment and our destiny, not simply be takers of trends set elsewhere.
We have learned that global engagement is demanding work requiring
large resources, great stamina and reserves of patience. And it can only
be sustained through constant dialogue with the interests and instincts of
the Australian people.82

Australia's own 'comprehensive security' needs and the regional leverage she
gains in its pursuit augur magnificently for future Canberra-driven regional
cooperation initiatives. As the government itself states: "Our objective is to
achieve practical results that improve the overall security of the region and
protect Australian interests in the process".83 Less certain is whether the Pacific
Island 'recipients' of this 'cooperation'will be able to heed the exhortations of
that visionary Fijian leader, the late Ratu Sir Kamisese Mara, by retaining "firm
control of their destinies". This of itself is unremarkable: Australian tax-payers can
reasonably expect their government to be dutiful in its administration of foreign
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John Howard's recent Lowy Lecture on "Australia in the World"will have done little
to assuage concerns of "a la carte" policy formulation:
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The same principle, if unchecked, could end up being an Australian version
of a la carte multilateralism, where multilateral collaboration serves as little
more than a highly selective enterprise for advancing Canberra's interests,
quite possibly at the expense of those of the region as a whole. If so, the
Forum process could well be undermined should Australia succumb to the
temptation for which America, in its post-9/11 intolerance, seems to have
fallen. In this regard, Australia's announced intention to regard multilateral
action as less effective than coalitions of the willing raisin troubling
questions.81
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in Iraq, Australian Prime Minister John Howard suggested changing the United
Nations Charter to allow "pre-emptive self-defence".80 Unsurprisingly, many are
now concerned at the potential breadth of the Howard / Downer doctrine of
cooperative intervention:
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aid - particularly as liberal approaches have consistently failed. For those states
largely sustained by Australian aid, such as PNG, a stiff dose of realist policy is
not only to be expected but, arguably, required. Similarly, as attested by the
self-congratulatory atmosphere during the 'RAMSI update' to the 2004 Forum
Regional Security Committee meeting, RAMSI is apt to be hoisted aloft as a truly
regional success, notwithstanding the backroom "haggling" that attended its
inception.
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Prognoses for future cooperation, however, turn as much upon politics as policy.
Institutions that enable region-wide resource-sharing, as so openly espoused by
John Howard, requireapoliticalclimatethatconducescooperation. Unfortunately,
where political climate matters most— in the Forum itself— Australia is wide open
to allegations of gross manipulation.
Such allegations matter. The Forum's Pacific Plan will challenge Pacific Island
leaders to be brave in reformulating notions of sovereignty. As Samoan Prime
Minister and current Forum Chair, Tuilaepa Sailele Malielegaoi, observed at the
Forum Leaders' review of the Plan only this March, "in a globalised world none
of us can remain an island... Over the next few years we will need to explore
how far we can take our sense of shared sovereignty, and shared responsibility,
in our pursuit of regionalism".84 These are early days for the Pacific Plan. Success
at this delicate stage will require not only Pacific confidence in the Forum, its
secretariat and its processes but also a climate of persuasion— not provocation.
An Australian foreign policy that purports to flex "through constant dialogue
with the interests and instincts of the Australian people" certainly cannot be sold
through process manipulation and "naive and patronising lectures" that only
antagonise the already exposed nerve-ends of Pacific sovereignty. For all that
change may be required, the Howard government would do well to note that the
'Pacific Way' is less about what is done than how it is done.
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